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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to examine the formation of a separate risk management committee (RMC) and 
its effect on the modified audit report among the non-banking and financial companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia. Data was collected from the annual reports of a sample of 300 companies from 2004 until 
2009. Both descriptive and multivariate analyses were employed to address the research objectives. 
The results indicate that a separate RMC is negatively related with the acceptance of the modified 
audit report. Further, the RMC’s members with independent non-executive status and members with 
accounting and financial background will also probably reduce the acceptance of the modified audit 
report. However, losses recorded for previous financial years are likely to increase the issuance of 
modified audit report by the auditor. The period of auditor engagement with the client and client size 
will also affect the modified audit report. The findings provide empirical evidence on the development 
and importance of a separate RMC for the modified audit report. 
Keywords: Separate risk management committee, modified audit report, Malaysia.
 Introduction
Generally, in the risk management committee 
structure are the risk management function 
combined with the audit committee (known as 
combined RMC) and the existence of separate 
risk management committee (known as separate 
RMC) both of which are the sub-committees of 
the board of directors (BOD). The objective of 
this study is to examine whether the existence 
of a separate RMC gives any effect on the 
modified audit report particularly on risk issues. 
Traditionally, the audit committee performs the 
risk management function (Yatim, 2009) and it 
is a challenge to this committee to add a new job 
portfolio. Whereas, Zaman (2001) added that it 
was unreasonable to expect the audit committee 
to perform a new job  given their lack of time and 
expertise. Risk management is not only involved 
in the risks of  performing financial statements 
and internal control system for which the audit 
committee has expertise on this routine job but 
risk management involves the risks surrounding 
the external business operation and its viability 
such as marketing risk and competition risk. 
As the result, the formation of a separate 
RMC which focuses only on the risks profile 
of the company will be seen a help to manage 
the risks effectively and to improve company 
performance (Liew, Mat Zain, & Jaffar, 2012). 
ht
tp
://
m
m
j.u
um
.e
du
.m
y/
44
Malaysian Management Journal Vol. 17, 43–58 (2013)
Further, Subramaniam, McManus and Zhang 
(2009) added that an effective risk management 
was seen to enhance the quality of financial 
reporting, achieve the company’s objectives 
as well as safeguard its reputation. Iyengar, 
Land and Zampelli (2010) argued that the 
board’s committee had the implication and the 
influence on the quality of financial reporting. 
The formation of a separate RMC focusing on 
the broad areas of risks including internal and 
external risks will help the company in managing 
those risks without depending only on the audit 
committee. Some expertise on the company 
business’s external environment is needed in a 
separate RMC rather than depend on the audit 
committee members who have the expertise in 
internal control and accounting transactions. For 
example, separate RMC members with expertise 
on business opportunity and investment will 
evaluate the company’s viability in future and 
reduce the risks of going-concern. This situation 
will reduce the acceptance of the modified audit 
report by the company. 
Although the RMC is strongly recommended, its 
formation is still voluntary and not mandatory in 
most countries in the world including Malaysia. 
Combined Code, FRC (2006) and Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG (2007; 
2012) have clearly stated that the BOD has its 
principal responsibility to ensure an in-place 
system that effectively identifies, assesses, 
monitors and manages key business risks. 
Furthermore, at the Corporate Governance Week 
2011, the chairman of the Security Commission 
Malaysia (2011)  highlighted the to the BOD 
about the responsibility in the risk management 
process. She was concerned about the failure of 
the BOD to establish an appropriate measure for 
the risk management process in the company. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) (2004; 
2012) issued in its Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM), an integrated framework for the ERM 
process. This framework involves the board and 
the management at all levels for risk profile of 
the organization. Therefore, the existence of 
the RMC is seen as a best measure for the risk 
management initiative in the company. This 
study offers a new insight into the relationship 
between the existence of a separate RMC and 
the modified audit report. This relationship 
motivates us to study more about the RMC and 
its effect on the modified audit report particularly 
on risk issues. Normally, one of the elements 
in a company’s financial reporting is what the 
stakeholders such as investors, shareholders and 
regulators are likely to look up in the report of the 
auditor besides the profit, asset value and share 
price of the company (Ismail & Abdul Rahim, 
2011). The modified audit report indicates a 
company’s financial reporting has a problem or 
views the financial report as bad. 
This study contributes to the knowledge that the 
existence of a separate RMC gives impact to the 
acceptance of the modified audit report by the 
company. The job profile of a separate RMC 
focusing on the broad areas of risks can reduce 
the exposure of risks by the company including 
the external risks such as going-concern risks 
and competition risks. Consequently, the 
probability of receiving a modified audit report 
particularly on the risk issue is less due to the 
effective managing of the risk exposure to the 
company. Theoretically, this situation creates 
a linkage between the separate RMC and the 
modified audit report and further on the quality 
of financial reporting. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II describes the 
past literature and hypotheses development. 
Section III provides the research methodology, 
followed by section IV with the analysis of the 
results and the discussion. Lastly, section V 
presents the conclusion and recommendation.  
 
 
Previous Research and Hypotheses 
Development
The study on the effectiveness of the RMC and 
the modified audit report remains scant and 
limited. However, some previous studies have 
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examined the relationship between the board’s 
characteristics or the audit committee composition 
and the audit opinion (see Carcello & Neal, 2000; 
Farinha, & Viana, 2009; Masyitoh, & Adhariani, 
2010; Wenyao, & Qin, 2007; Pucheta-Martinez, 
& Fuentes, 2007). The role of the RMC in risk 
management is relatively unexplored and the 
literature in that field is limited and scant. Tufano 
(1996) added that the lack of research in the risk 
management committee was due to the lack of a 
meaningful data on risk management practices. 
Subramniam and Carey (2011) reported that 
the establishment of a formalized system of 
risk management in an organization was a more 
recent development. The establishment of the 
RMC is seen to be a complement to the oversight 
function of the board of directors and might be 
able to reduce the burden of the task by the audit 
committee. Whereas, Fields and Keys (2003) 
claimed that RMCs have gained popularity as 
important oversight committees. Furthermore, 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) added that the 
existence of a separate RMC focusing on the 
risk profile was also able to increase the quality 
of internal monitoring and quality of financial 
reporting in relation to risk management. While 
Iyengar et al. (2010) supported the idea that the 
board committee was able to give implication on 
the quality of financial reporting. The existence 
of a separate RMC has the job profile on broad 
areas of risks including the internal and external 
risks. The external risks are more challenging 
due to the unexpected impacts in the future and 
are involved with the viability of the business. 
The experts and the qualified members of the 
RMC effectively manage those risks and reduce 
the exposure to these types of risks. Eventually, 
the likelihood of the company receiving the 
modified audit report in relation to these risks 
is reduced and increases the quality of the 
company’s financial reporting. The establishment 
of a separate or a stand-alone RMC is also seen 
as being able to implement its oversight function 
for the risk management profile of the company. 
Compared to the other board committees such 
as the audit committee, it has a lot of duties on 
internal control and accounting transactions. It 
has no time to evaluate the detail on the external 
risks such as business opportunity, marketing 
and completion risks. The lack of expertise 
among the members of the audit committee in the 
business industry and the investment opportunity 
makes it difficult to evaluate these types of risks 
(Zaman, 2001). Thus, the hypothesis is generated 
as follows:
H1: The existence of a separate or distinct 
RMC is negatively associated with 
the probability that the company will 
receive the modified audit report. 
The researchers also included some other factors 
that contribute to the acceptance of the modified 
audit opinions by a company such as whether they 
are the RMC’s characteristics or  other factors. 
The researchers considered the independence of 
the RMC (RMCINDE), qualifications of RMC 
(RMCQUAL), loss (LOSS), auditor tenure 
(AUTEN) and client size (CLSIZE).
Composition of the individuals who serve on the 
board is an important element in creating a board 
that is an effective monitor on risk matter. The 
board’s oversight committee is seen to be more 
efficient if the members come from the outside or 
are independent members because these people 
have the reputation of being experts (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The monitoring and oversight 
function performed by this type of members 
tends to be more adhered to the related approved 
standards, laws and regulations, and any violation 
of such standards and requirements only creates a 
negative perception among the outside firms that 
are interested in their expertise (Carcello & Neal, 
2000). This is consistent as in the agency theory 
view where outside or independent directors will 
be able to monitor any self-interested actions by 
the managers to lower agency cost (Nicholson, 
& Kiel, 2007). A current practice for audit 
committees in Malaysia, (MCCG, 2007; 2012) 
is that all the members should be non-executive 
members and the committee should encompass at 
least three members. While for the composition 
of the BOD, in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
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Combined Code, FRC (2010) recommends 
that at least half of the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise independent non-
executive directors (INEDs) while the Australian 
Securities Exchange (2010, 2nd edition), the 
Corporate Governance Council explains that 
the majority of the board should be independent 
directors. Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt (2003) 
exposed that the non-executive board members 
reduced the probability of the company receiving 
accounting fraud and this study is consistent 
with the literature of Klein, 2002; Beasley, 1996; 
Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2005. However, 
Wenyao, and Qin (2007) found insignificant 
relationship between independent board 
members and the modified audit opinion. Hence, 
the independence of the RMC (RMCINDE) is 
expected to have a negative relationship with the 
probability of the company receiving a modified 
audit opinion. 
The possession of academic backgrounds such 
as accounting and finance as well as industry-
specific knowledge by the board members would 
enable them to better understand the company’s 
issues and problems (Roberts, McNulty, & 
Stiles, 2005) and Md Yusof (2010) argued that 
an audit committee with a higher proportion of 
financial experts would lead to credible financial 
reporting.
The ability to govern also depends on the 
knowledge and skill owned by the board 
members (Lorsch, 1995) and the argument is 
supported by (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995) 
that to be effective in monitoring strategic 
decisions, directors should be individuals with 
relevant knowledge and expertise. Yatim (2009) 
suggested that the audit committee members with 
finance or accounting backgrounds have a better 
understanding of risk management activities and 
can engage more actively in the risk management 
process. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) supported 
the idea that board members with finance 
and accounting backgrounds have a better 
understanding of the auditing issues including 
risk awareness and risk detection. Further, 
Carcello and Neal (2003) argued that a financial 
expert would be more effective in supporting 
the auditor’s decision to issue going-concern 
opinions. Further, RMC members with finance 
and accounting backgrounds (RMCQUAL) 
would be expected to have an effect on the duties 
they are performing especially in relation to risk 
awareness and risk identification.
If a company reports consecutive losses, this 
will be likely to have an impact on the auditor’s 
opinion (Farinha & Viana, 2009). They have 
proved this argument in their study that the 
existence of consecutive losses has a positive 
impact on the issuance of a modified report by the 
auditor. This is also consistent with the study done 
by Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) that the 
company which reported losses in the previous 
year has a positive relationship with the chance 
to receive a qualified audit report in the current 
year. Companies that reported consecutive losses 
will be characterized by greater financial risks 
and even modified opinions will be issued. Thus, 
it is expected that there is a positive relationship 
between consecutives losses (LOSS) and the 
current modified audit report.   
According to Shockley (1982), a long relationship 
between the client and the auditor would lead to 
less rigorous scrutiny and blind reliance on the 
client. Also, Vanstraelen (2000) reported a long 
relationship reduced the auditor’s willingness to 
issue a qualified audit report. Al-Thuneibat, Ai 
Issa and Ata Baker (2011) supported the idea that 
the long audit tenure  affected the audit quality 
performed by the auditor. Some researchers 
have studied the effectiveness of rotation or 
mandatory rotation of the external auditor. For 
instance, Lu and Sivaramakrishnan (2009) 
examined the effect of mandatory audit firm 
rotation on the company’s investment decision 
while Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) investigated 
the relationship between audit firm rotation and 
independence-related perception. The result 
of this study revealed that audit firm rotation 
does not strengthen independent appearances 
among non-professional investors. In terms of 
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audit quality, Jackson, Moldrich and Roebuck 
(2008) found that mandatory audit firm rotation 
does not improve the audit quality and auditor 
independence. In this study, the researcher 
expected that there would be a negative 
relationship between auditor tenure (AUTEN) 
and the modified audit report. 
The size of the client may influence the auditor 
for the issuance of an audit opinion (Pucheta-
Martinez & Feuntes, 2007). They argued the risk 
of damage to the auditor’s reputation and the 
risk of litigation to the auditor. Hence, a more 
independent audit approach would be absorbed 
and more likely a modified audit report will 
be issued. However, McKeown, Mutchler and 
Hopwood (1991) found a negative relationship 
between client size and the receipt of a qualified 
audit report. This finding was supported by the 
next few studies (see Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Huss, 1995; Mutchler, Hopwood, & McKeown, 
1997). Nevertheless, the researcher expected 
a positive relationship between client size 
(CLSIZE) and the issuance of a modified audit 
report by the auditor.
Research Methodology
We used the logistic regression analysis to 
examine the relationship between the modified 
audit report and the variables proposed for the 
existence of a separate RMC. The model used to 
test the hypotheses is as follows: 
MA= β0 + β1 SEPRMC + β2 RMCINDE + β3 
RMCQUAL + β4 LOSS + β5 AUTEN + β6 
CLSIZE + ε where:-
MA -Modified Audit Report 1, 
if received modified audit, 
otherwise 0  
 
SEPRMC -Separate RMC
 1, if there is the existence of a 
separate RMC, otherwise 0
RMCINDE -RMC Independence proportion 
of independent non-executive 
members on the RMC   
RMCQUAL -RMC Qualification
 proportion of RMC 
members with accounting or 
finance qualification
LOSS -Loss 
 1, if the company reported loss 
in either or both of the two 
previous years, otherwise 0
AUTEN -Auditor Tenure 
 number of years of engagement 
with the same audit firm
CLSIZE -Client Size
 natural log of total assets (in 
millions of Ringgit Malaysia)
Variable Definition and Measurement
According to Aren et al. (2009) there are 
five types of audit reports, namely standard 
unqualified or clean audit report, unqualified 
with explanatory paragraph or modified wording, 
qualified, adverse and disclaimer audit report. 
For the purpose of this study, the unqualified 
with explanatory paragraph (modified wording), 
qualified (except for), adverse and disclaimer 
audit report are classified as modified audit 
reports. If a company received a modified audit 
report, the data is valued as ‘1’ in the worksheet 
and if a company received the audit report other 
than the modified audit report, the value of ‘0’ is 
coded accordingly.
The researcher considers that there is the existence 
of a separate RMC if the committee has a single 
committee with the title of ‘risk management 
committee’ without any combination with any 
other committee including the audit committee. 
Any combination of tasks and responsibility of 
risk management with other committees’ tasks 
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are considered as non- existence of a separate 
RMC (Combined RMC). For the purpose of this 
study, if the company has a separate RMC, it is 
coded as ‘1’ and if a company does not have a 
separate RMC, the value of ‘0’ is coded. This 
criterion has been used by previous studies such 
as Subramaniam et al. (2009) and Yatim (2009). 
RMC independence refers to the number of 
independent non-executive members on the 
RMC. The data can be accessed through the 
directors’ profiles and the composition of the 
RMC in the company’s annual report. The 
number of independent non-executive members 
is  divided by the total number of RMC members 
and then the proportion number is generated (see 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Farinha & Viana, 2009; 
Pucheta-Martinez & Fuentes, 2007).
For RMC qualification, the researcher has 
carefully read the directors’ profiles to identify 
the qualification of the RMC members. For this 
study, the researcher has looked up the formal 
accounting or financial educational background 
of the RMC members and their academic level 
with at least a bachelor’s degree and above. The 
proportion figure is generated by the total number 
of RMC members with the said qualification 
divided by the total number of members sitting 
on the RMC (see Yatim, 2009).
Loss in this study refers to the consecutive 
losses recorded by a company and the term of 
consecutive losses in this study refers to the last 
two years a company has recorded losses. The 
data of loss can be accessed through the profit 
and loss statement or the income statement in the 
financial statement. The researcher coded with a 
dummy of ‘1’ for the company which reported 
loss in either or both of the two previous financial 
years and coded a dummy of ‘0’ for otherwise. 
Farinha and Viana (2009) and Pucheta-Martinez 
and Fuentes (2007) have applied this rule in their 
studies.
For the auditor tenure, the researcher has 
reviewed the companies’ annual report for every 
financial year for the duration of the period of the 
population and the sample selected in this study 
which is from 2004 until 2009. The researcher 
has identified how many years the company has 
engaged the same audit firm. The number of 
years of engagement with the same audit firm 
was keyed into the worksheet. This measurement 
was also applied by the previous studies such as 
by Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007).
Client size was also adopted as a control variable 
in this study. For the purpose of this study, the 
researcher decided to measure the variable 
by looking at the total assets owned by the 
company. The total assets were valued in Ringgit 
Malaysia (RM) since the Malaysian public- listed 
companies use RM for all the transactions and 
records. The data of total assets was  accessed 
through the balance sheet statement and the value 
was entered into the worksheet. The use of this 
variable and measurement has been practiced 
by Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) and 
Carcello and Neal (2000).
 
Data Collection and Sampling Procedure
The population frame for this study is all the 
public-listed companies excluding the banking 
and the financial institutions listed in Bursa 
Malaysia’s website from the period of the 
financial years from 2004 until 2009. Based 
on the data gathered through Bursa Malaysia’s 
website, there were approximately more than 130 
companies with modified audit reports for the 
same period (2004-2009) and there were more 
than 200 companies which had a separate or a 
stand-alone RMC disclosure for the said period 
(Bursa Malaysia’s website, 2012; Yatim, 2009; 
2010). The banking and financial institutions 
were omitted from the sample as the nature and 
regulations of these firms were significantly 
different from the non-financial companies. 
The public-listed companies were chosen for 
this study. The public-listed companies have 
published their annual reports that are publicly 
available and could be accessed through Bursa 
Malaysia’s website.
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A match-sampling approach was adopted as a 
control procedure (see Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 
2005; Wenyao & Qin, 2007; Sekaran, 2003). 
Firstly, the researcher selected the companies 
with modified audit reports for the period of 
study (2004-2009). Then, they were matched 
to the control samples which had clean audit 
reports based on the conditions that the paired 
companies were in the same industry, most 
similar in company size (total assets) and in the 
same period of the financial year (Ballesta & 
Garcia-Meca, 2005; Wenyao & Qin, 2007). To 
keep reliable and independence, once a control 
company has been matched to the corresponding 
company in the test sample in a particular year, it 
was not allowed to be matched again with another 
company (test sample) in another year (Ballesta 
& Garcia-Meca, 2005). Besides, any company 
which never stated whether it was separate or 
a combined RMC or risk management matters, 
was dropped from the sample list. Lastly, in this 
study, 150 samples with modified audit opinions 
were gathered and matched with 150 samples 
with clean audit opinion. Therefore, the total 
number of samples in this study was 300. 
 
 
Analysis of Result and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics for Samples
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics result 
for all the companies, modified audit opinion 
companies and clean audit opinion companies 
together with the result of the t-test. For the 
variable of Separate RMC (SEPRMC), the 
result shows an average of 13 per cent from 
the samples having separate RMCs for all the 
companies but for the modified audit opinion 
companies, the result shows only 6 per cent 
of the samples having separate RMCs while 
for clean audit opinion companies the result 
shows an average of 20 per cent of the samples 
having separate RMCs. As expected earlier, the 
percentage of companies with separate RMCs 
is larger in clean audit opinion companies due 
to the characteristic of the separate RMC and 
its function. The Independent t-test for the 
variable of Separate RMC shows a statistically 
significant level of p < 0.01. It is means that there 
is a significant difference in the average for this 
variable between two different sets of samples 
(modified and clean audit opinion companies). 
For RMC Independence (RMCINDE), the mean 
for modified audit opinion companies is 75 per 
cent while for clean audit opinion companies it 
is 78 per cent. The higher percentage in clean 
audit opinion companies is expected because 
of the features and the status owned by the 
independent RMC members. For the sample of 
all the companies, the result reports that 76 per 
cent of the RMC members are of independent 
non-executive status. The comparison of mean 
(t-test) for this variable is significant the 10 
per cent level (2-tailed) with the indication that 
there is a significant difference in average for the 
variable of RMC Independence. 
The descriptive analysis also reports for the 
variable of RMC Qualification (RMCQUAL). 
In sample of modified audit opinion companies, 
the mean or average value is recorded at 37 per 
cent while for the group of clean audit opinion 
companies, the average value is 39 per cent. On 
the average, more RMC members in clean audit 
opinion companies have accounting or financial 
academic background compared to the sample 
of modified audit opinion companies. However, 
the difference of the mean for this variable 
between the modified and the clean audit opinion 
companies is statistically not significant. There 
is no significant or large difference in the mean 
value for this variable. 
For the variable of Loss (LOSS), the result shows 
an average of 81 per cent for the samples of 
modified audit opinion companies that recorded 
loss in the previous financial year. But, in the 
clean audit opinion companies, only 44 per cent 
or below of the samples recorded loss in the 
previous financial year. This huge difference was 
expected by the researcher as the previous losses 
recorded by the companies have more impact 
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on the current financial year. For the all the 
companies, the mean value reports 62 per cent. 
The t-test is also records a significant difference 
(p < 0.01) for the mean between the modified and 
clean audit companies. 
The modified audit opinion companies record a 
maximum of 10 years of engagement (AUTEN) 
with the same audit firm while the clean audit 
opinion companies, the maximum period of 
engagement is 11 years. For the mean or the 
average value for these two groups of samples, 
the result shows about 4 years of engagement 
with the same audit firm. The t-test the result 
shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference at the level of 10 per cent (2-tailed) 
for this variable.
For the variable of client size (CLSIZE), the 
modified audit opinion companies have RM 230 
million on average for the total asset owned while 
the clean audit opinion companies have only an 
average of RM 184 million of assets. For the 
difference of the mean or the average between 
these two groups of samples, the t-test result 
recorded significant at the 10 per cent level.
Correlation Analysis (Pearson Correlation 
Matrix) for Variables
Table 2 reports the result of correlation among 
the variables. The correlations are quite low, 
generally below 0.3 except for a pair of modified 
audit opinion companies (MA) and loss (LOSS) 
which are correlated at 38 per cent with a 
significant level of 0.01. It means that MA and 
LOSS have a quite strong relationship with 
the assumption that LOSS has a major effect 
on MA. Besides, a separate RMC also has an 
effect on MA with a correlation of 21 per cent 
and it is significant at the 0.01 level. The other 
variables that correlated are separate RMC and 
RMC Independence at 21 per cent at (p < 0.01), 
a separate RMC and client size (18 per cent at p < 
0.01) and the pair of auditor tenure and client size 
(12 per cent at p < 0.05). The rest of the variables 
are not correlated to each other. The result also 
reveals that there is no higher correlation than 
85 per cent which means no multicolinearity 
problem exists in the samples. 
Table 2
Result of Correlation (Pearson Correlation Matrix)
Modified 
Audit 
Opinion
RMC 
Independence
RMC 
Qualification
Loss Auditor 
Tenure
Client Size
Modified Audit Opinion 1 -.092 -.063 .378** -.085 .095
Separate RMC -.211** -.041 -.027 .095 .180**
RMC Independence 1 .046 -.036 -.004 -.112
RMC Qualification 1 .003 -.089 -.003
Loss 1 -.016 -.013
Auditor Tenure 1 .122*
Client Size 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 3 reports the logistic regression result. 
The model consists of the independent variables 
(separate RMC) and the control variables (RMC 
independence, RMC qualification, loss, auditor 
tenure and client size) with modified audit report 
as the dependent variable. The result shows the 
level of correct classification (the percentage of 
correct predictions) at 70 per cent while the Cox 
& Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square report 
at 22 per cent and 29 per cent respectively. The 
chi-square test reports at 74.756 and the model is 
significant at the level of 0.00 (p < 0.01).  All the 
variables (independent and control variables) are 
significant in the expected direction. 
For the hypothesis of the separate RMC 
(SEPRMC), it is statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level with a negative sign. For 
Table 3
Result of the Logistic Regressions
MA= β0 + β1 SEPRMC + β2 RMCINDE + β3 RMCQUAL + β4 LOSS + β5 AUTEN + β6 CLSIZE 
+ ε
Variables Expected Sign SEPRMC + CV
Independent Variable Coefficient Wald test p-value
SEPRMC - -1.936 16.748                 .000
Control Variables
RMCINDE - -1.439 4.040 .044
RMCQUAL - -1.173 2.369 .124
LOSS + 1.786 40.479 .000
AUTEN - -.083 2.765 .096
CLSIZE + .002 6.265 .012
Constant .727 1.021 .312
Chi-square(sig) 74.756(.000)
Cox & Snell R Square .221
Nagelkerke R Square .294
Clasification 70.3%
Variable Definition:
SEPRMC =  1, if there is the existence of a separate RMC, otherwise 0
RMCINDE =  proportion of independent non-executive members on the RMC   
RMCQUAL =  proportion of RMC members with accounting or finance qualification
LOSS =  1, if the company reported loss in either or both of the two previous years, otherwise 0
AUTEN =  number of years of engagement with the same audit firm
CLSIZE = natural log of total assets (in millions of Ringgit Malaysia)
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coefficient, SEPRMC reports at more than 190 
per cent and it means that if a company has a 
separate RMC, the probability of the company 
not  receiving a modified audit opinion is at 
190 per cent. The examples of the companies 
that have separate RMCs are Opcom Holdings 
Berhad, Bolton Berhad and Genetec Technology 
Berhad. The result supports the argument by 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) that the existence 
of a separate RMC focusing on the risk profile 
is also able to increase the quality of internal 
monitoring and quality of financial reporting in 
relation to risk management. Consequently, the 
likelihood of the company receiving a modified 
audit report, particularly for risk issues, is less. 
Meanwhile, Harrison (1987) reported that RMC 
is seen to specifically enhance the accountability 
of the board as it provides an independent 
oversight of various board activities especially 
on the risk issues. Due to the contribution of the 
RMC, Fields and Keys (2003) argued that RMC 
has gained popularity as an important oversight 
committee even though most of the countries 
in the world are still considering it as a  reserve 
as mandatory requirement to form a separate 
RMC in the company. The result supports the 
proposition of the hypothesis (SEPRMC) that 
the existence of separate RMC will influence the 
company not to receive a modified audit report. 
This result is also consistent with the requirement 
of MCCG 2007 and 2012 which clearly states 
that the board has the principal responsibility 
on the risk process including the identification 
of the principal risk until the implementation of 
the appropriate system to manage those risks. 
Consequently, the formation of a separate RMC 
as a board committee is able to enhance the 
effectiveness of the risk oversight function by 
the BOD as reported in the result of this study 
where the existence of a separate RMC gives 
impact to the company not to receive a modified 
audit opinion. 
For the control variable of RMC independence 
(RMCINDE), the result also shows it as 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
in a negative direction as expected earlier. For 
coefficient, the result shows 140 per cent with 
the indication that if a company has a higher 
number of independent non-executive members 
on the RMC, the probability of the company not 
receiving a modified audit opinion is at 140 per 
cent. The result is consistent with the earlier study 
by Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) which 
found a significant influence between the audit 
committee with more independent members and 
the receipt of qualification of audit report, and 
Xie et al. (2003) added that the non-executive 
board members reduced the probability of the 
company receiving accounting fraud. However, 
Wenyao and Qin (2007) found an insignificant 
relationship between the independent board 
members and the receipt of a modified audit 
opinion. As a conclusion, the result reveals that 
the independent non-executive members sitting 
on a RMC give affects the issuance of a modified 
audit opinion. This type of committee members 
(independent non-executive members) have 
the role to influence the acceptance of a modified 
audit opinion in terms of risk issues. 
The RMC qualification (RMCQUAL)  is 
statistically significant (p < 0.10) (2 tailed) and 
with a negative sign which follows the proposed 
direction. It is reported at more than 100 per 
cent for beta coefficient and it means that if 
the members of the RMC have accounting or 
financial academic background, the likelihood 
of the company not receiving a modified audit 
opinion is more than 100 per cent. The result is 
consistent with the argument by DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) that board members with finance 
and accounting backgrounds have a better 
understanding of the auditing issues including 
risk awareness and risk detection. Whereas, in 
the audit committee Yatim (2009) suggested that 
members with finance or accounting backgrounds 
have a better understanding of risk management 
activities and would be able to be engaged more 
actively in the risk management process. Chung, 
Ho and Kim (2004) and Ho and Wong (2001) in 
their earlier studies found that the inclusion of 
experts in the board committee serves as a means 
of reducing information asymmetry, managerial 
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opportunism and improving disclosure quality 
and enhancing the effectiveness of resources. 
The knowledge gained by the RMC members 
through the formal study of accounting and 
finance is an advantage to them. They have 
learned the internal and external treats of being 
a business organization as well as the strategic 
solution for the situations faced. They are able to 
monitor the risk profiles of the organization and 
eventually affect the auditor’s concern of risk 
issues. Therefore, this result implies that RMC 
qualification has a relationship with the modified 
audit opinion issued by the auditor.
 
Next, the variable of loss (LOSS) also recorded 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level 
with a positive sign. It provides more than 170 
per cent for coefficient and it means that if a 
company received a loss in the previous years, 
there is a 170 per cent probability the company 
will receive a modified audit opinion in the 
current year. The result support the findings 
of the study conducted by Farinha and Viana 
(2009) that the existence of consecutive losses 
has a positive impact on the issuance of a 
modified opinion by the auditor. Pucheta-
Martinez and Fuentes (2007) also added that 
the which company which reported losses in the 
previous year has a positive relationship with the 
chance to receive a qualified audit report in the 
current year. The loss experienced by a company 
has an impact on the financial stability and future 
business operation. Eventually, there emerges 
the risk of going-concern to that company and 
from the above result, loss has an association 
with the modified audit opinion.
The variable of auditor tenure (AUTEN), 
is also statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent level with a lower beta coefficient has 
a 8 per cent (at negative sign). It indicates 
that if a company has a long engagement 
with the same audit firm, the likelihood of 
the company not to receive a modified audit 
report is only at 8 per cent. The result supports 
the finding of the study done by Vanstraelen 
(2000) that a long relationship between the client 
and the audit firm will reduce the acceptance of 
a modified audit report. With a long engagement 
with the same audit firm, more improvements 
would have been made by the client company 
before the audit was made.
Lastly, the variable of client size (CLSIZE) 
records a significant association with the 
modified audit report at p < 0.05 with a positive 
sign as expected. For coefficient, the result 
presents only 0.2 per cent with the indication that 
the larger the assets of a company, the probability 
of the company receiving a modified audit report 
is only at 0.2 per cent. However, the result is 
inconsistent with the study done by McKeown 
et al. (1991) that client size has a negative 
relationship with the receipt of a qualified audit 
report. 
Conclusion and Limitations
The result of the statistical analysis has shown 
some significant findings. Firstly, the result 
documented that the existence of a separate 
risk management committee (RMC) affects 
the issuance of a modified audit report by 
the auditors. The finding contributes to the 
knowledge and literature that the existence 
of a separate RMC has an implication on the 
acceptance of a modified audit report specifically 
in the Malaysian environment. The existence of a 
separate RMC probably will reduce the issuance 
of a modified audit report. Consequently, 
the formation of a separate RMC as a board 
committee is able to enhance the effectiveness 
of the risk oversight function by the BOD as 
reported in the result of this study where the 
existence of a separate RMC gives an impact 
on the company not to receive a modified audit 
report. The regulators and policy makers have 
to consider  this situation. The formation of a 
separate RMC should be mandatory in future so 
as to perform the risk oversight function at the 
board level. 
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The RMC members with the status of 
independent non-executives have a major effect 
on the acceptance of a modified audit report. The 
statistical result presented in this study shows that 
the independent non-executive members sitting 
on the RMC are able to influence the company not 
to receive a modified audit report. The oversight 
role played by this kind of RMC members is 
free from the influence of the management and 
is acted independently particularly for the risk 
profiles of the company. Looking at the current 
practice of the audit committee, MCCG (2007; 
2012) has stipulated that all the members in the 
audit committee are independent non-executive 
members. This guideline should be applied for 
the RMC if a separate RMC is mandatory to be 
established in future. 
The accounting and financial academic 
backgrounds of the RMC members have an 
influence on the receiving of a modified audit 
opinion. This study has documented that RMC 
members with accounting or financial academic 
backgrounds will probably reduce the acceptance 
of  a modified audit report in relation to the risk 
issues. The knowledge of these members will 
help them in implementing the oversight role as 
board committee members either for internal or 
external risks. More attention should be given 
to the appointment of RMC members because 
the criteria of academic background is also an 
important factor. 
Another element that affects the acceptance 
of a modified report is the previous loss of the 
company. The losses of the previous financial 
year are more related to the stability and the 
viability of the company. The auditor will 
consider the company’s previous record and the 
solution in the current financial year before the 
professional opinion is issued. This study reveals 
the consequence of the company with previous 
loss where it will receive the modified audit 
report in the current year.  
The engagement period between the client and 
the audit firm also has an impact on the receipt of 
the modified audit report by the client company. 
The long engagement between the client and the 
audit firm probably will reduce the acceptance 
of the modified audit report. The reason may be 
due to the improvements that have been made by 
the client company as a response to the auditor’s 
concern of the previous financial year. The total 
assets owned by the company has a small effect 
on the acceptance of the modified audit report 
by the company. The bigger the assets owned by 
the company the more positive the impact for the 
company to receive the modified report. A small 
part of the organization is overlooked and causes 
the acceptance of the modified audit report.
This study,  like  other studies,  has limitations. 
This study used secondary data as samples in 
which the company’s annual reports were used 
as the main source. May be in the future, the 
researcher can use a different method of data 
collection such as interview with the auditors 
and the risk officers. Questionnaires also can 
be used by the researcher in order to collect 
the primary data. These types of data collection 
methods are important to the researcher to know 
some other implicit information that could be 
raised by the auditors or other respondents. The 
formation of the RMC is still voluntary and not 
mandatory in most countries in the world. The 
study for the efficiency of this board committee 
is limited and scant. Future study should be done 
on its efficiency in terms of other indications 
such as the company market share, profit and 
investment opportunity. The study should 
also examine the roles played by this board 
committee for the existence of a separate RMC 
and its characteristics. 
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